This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

+ *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.

+ *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.

+ *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.

+ *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at `http://books.google.com/`

US
1670
21.5A

U5AR70.21.5
A

HARVARD
COLLEGE
LIBRARY



The Monroe Doctrine Thoroughly Explained

Price 10 cents

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

BY

GEORGE FOX TUCKER

Author of "A Manual of Wills," "A Manual of Corporations;"
Joint author of "International Law"

BOSTON
ROCKWELL AND CHURCHILL PRESS
1903

OS1670.21.4

HARVARD
UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY
MAY 141954

Copyright, 1903,
By George Fox Tucker.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE.

I.

THE CAUSES WHICH LED TO THE DECLARATION OF PRESIDENT MONROE.

AT the close of the Revolutionary War little was known in Europe about the United States. On the other hand, the Americans were not ignorant of Europe; they entertained the idea that their young republic was not in favor at foreign courts, and they believed that they should not become a party to European disturbances, and also that monarchical institutions should not be allowed a foothold on American soil. An early note of warning may be found in Washington's Farewell Address, in which he asserts that our destiny is different from that of Europe, and that there should be "no entangling alliances."

With the downfall of Napoleon, in 1815, European governments began to pay more attention to the American republic. Then was formed the Holy Alliance, the parties to which were Russia, Austria, and Prussia; and after several congresses, in which

Great Britain and France participated, there was a final meeting at Verona in October, 1822, to consider the insurrection which broke out in Spain in the preceding year.

At this period the Spanish American colonies were claiming, and had long claimed, independence. At this Congress at Verona, England, through her envoy, the Duke of Wellington, declined to become a party to any agreement of interference in Spanish affairs. The commercial supremacy of England was then unquestioned, and her trade with the South and Central American States was of considerable importance and was likely to prosper more under local than under Spanish rule. The administration of England's foreign affairs was in the hands of Mr. Canning, the American minister at the Court of St. James was Richard Rush, and the Secretary of State was John Quincy Adams.

While the danger was impending, Mr. Canning, in August, 1823, proposed to Mr. Rush that the governments of England and of the United States should publish "a joint declaration before Europe" in opposition to the designs of the Alliance in regard to this hemisphere, the substance of which should be that while the two governments desired no portion of the colonies for themselves, they would not view with indifference any foreign intervention in their affairs, or their acquisition by any third power. He declared that a proposal would be made for a

European Congress, to consider the affairs of Spanish America, and that Great Britain would not participate in its counsels unless the United States was also represented. As to the Congress, Mr. Rush replied that it was the traditional policy of the United States to take no part in the politics of Europe; and as to the declaration, he remarked that he was without instructions from his government; yet he would assume the responsibility provided England would follow the example of the United States and acknowledge the independence of the Spanish American republics. This Mr. Canning declined to do, and the declaration was never made.

Upon the rejection of the proposal, Mr. Canning asserted to the French representative that Great Britain would not permit any European intervention in Spanish American affairs; and that representative disavowed for his government any intention so to interfere, and acquiesced in the opinion of Mr. Canning that the reduction of the colonies by Spain was hopeless.

II.

THE DECLARATION ITSELF.

BEFORE quoting from President Monroe, let us consider a few events which preceded the announcement of his Doctrine.

In the early days of the last century the title to

the Northwestern Territory of North America was claimed by Great Britain, Russia, and the United States. The settlement of their differences will be considered later.

In a communication to Mr. Rush, the American minister to Great Britain, dated July 2, 1823, in relation to this controversy, Mr. Adams, Secretary of State, declared that the American continents henceforth would no longer be subject to colonization; and a few days later, on the 17th of the same month, Mr. Adams remarked to the representative of Russia that "we should contest the right of Russia to any territorial establishment on this continent, and that we should assume distinctly the principle that the American continents are no longer subjects for any European colonial establishments." Mr. Charles Francis Adams, Sr., is authority for the statement that this is the first hint of the policy so well known afterward as the "Monroe Doctrine."

Just after this interview between Mr. Adams and the Russian representative, the conversations between Mr. Rush and Mr. Canning took place, to which reference has already been made. A full account of Mr. Canning's suggestions was at once transmitted by Mr. Rush to Mr. Adams, and the matter was brought to the notice of President Monroe. The latter considered the situation so grave that he solicited the opinions of ex-Presidents

Madison and Jefferson, both of whom wrote words of approval and encouragement.

This brings us to the declaration of the "Monroe Doctrine" in the President's message of Dec. 2, 1823. After alluding to the probable amicable settlement of the controversy as to the Northwestern Territory the President said: "The occasion has been adjudged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers."

Later, just before the close of the message, the President said, in reference to the disturbances in Spain, that it is the policy of the United States not to interfere with European affairs. He declared: "With the movements in this hemisphere we are, of necessity, more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the Allied Powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. . . . We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those Powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety."

And he further declared that "we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them (the Spanish American republics) or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. . . . It is impossible that the Allied Powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can any one believe that our Southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any form, with indifference."

In the message of Dec. 7, 1824, the President again referred to Spanish American affairs as follows:

"It is impossible for the European governments to interfere in their concerns (South American), especially in those alluded to which are vital, without affecting us; indeed, the motive which might induce such interference in the present state of the war between parties, if a war it might be called, would appear to be equally applicable to us. It is gratifying to know that some of the Powers with whom we enjoy a very friendly intercourse, and to whom these views have been communicated, have appeared to acquiesce in them."

Such are the statements of President Monroe giving rise to what is popularly called the "Monroe Doctrine," which may be condensed into the following declarations:

1. *No more European colonies on these continents.*
2. *No extension of the European political system to any portion of this hemisphere.*
3. *No European interposition in the affairs of the Spanish American republics.*

The President's message created a great stir in England. In the reference to colonization that nation did not concur; but, according to Mr. Rush, that part of the declaration which dealt with European intervention was hailed by the English people with exultation; and in the British Parliament it was the subject of praise from some of the leading statesmen. Spanish American deputies then in London were elated, and Spanish American securities at once rose in value; the Allies soon abandoned their hostile intentions, and intervention proved to be nothing more than a threat.

On the 20th of January, 1824, Henry Clay introduced in the House of Representatives a resolution to the effect that the people of this country would view with inquietude any forcible intervention by the Allied Powers, in behalf of Spain, to reduce the Spanish American States to their former subjection. This resolution and another of like tenor

were never called up. Thus soon after its announcement the Monroe Doctrine failed to receive legislative confirmation.

III.

THE PANAMA CONGRESS.

JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, Secretary of State, is generally regarded as the author of those passages in the message, from which the "Monroe Doctrine" is drawn. Adams succeeded Monroe as President, and very soon after his inauguration an invitation was extended by several of the South American republics to the government of this country to send envoys to a Congress of American States, to be held at Panama, to discuss questions and adopt measures affecting the welfare of the American continents.

Mr. Clay, then Secretary of State, in March, 1825, instructed the American minister to Mexico to urge upon the government of that country the expediency of asserting the principles laid down in the message of President Monroe; and in the following November President Adams decided to send commissioners to the Congress, provided the Senate would give its consent.

On the 26th of December the President sent a special message to the Senate, in which he stated his motives for acceding to the measure, and also

exposure of it to the world, may be probably all that the occasion would require."

Later the President, in answer to objections, stated that the acceptance of the invitation would not conflict with the counsel or the policy of Washington as to "entangling alliances."

The debate in the Senate upon the proposed mission was bitter, some contending that a participation in the deliberations of the Congress might be the means of involving us in international complications. However, the appointment of the envoys was at last agreed to. The concurrence of the House being now required to afford the appropriation necessary to carry the executive measure into effect, Daniel Webster, then a member of that body, delivered a speech upon the duty of the House, in which he said: "I look on the message of December, 1823, as forming a bright page in our history. I will neither help to erase it or tear it out; nor shall it be by any act of mine blurred or blotted. It did honor to the sagacity of the government, and I will not diminish that honor. It elevated the hopes and gratified the patriotism of the people. Over these hopes I will not bring a mildew; nor will I put that gratified patriotism to shame."

The statement by Mr. Adams as to the parties to be represented at the conference that "each will guard, by its own means, against the establishment of any future European colony within its borders,"

has been often criticised as a limitation of the Monroe Doctrine; but the explanation is offered by the late Mr. Richard H. Dana, "that each State represented at the Congress should make for itself the declaration which Mr. Monroe made for the United States in 1823,— that is, that its Territories were not open to appropriation by colonization, — and pledge itself to resist any attempts in that direction."

The envoys at last set out; but before their arrival at Panama the Congress had adjourned. On March 3, 1829, nearly three years after, the President, in laying before the Senate a copy of Mr. Clay's instructions to the deputies, said that while there was no probability of the renewal of negotiations, "the purposes for which they were intended are still of the deepest interest to our country and to the world, and may hereafter call again for the active energies of the government of the United States."

IV.

YUCATAN.

In his annual message of Dec. 2, 1845, President Polk stated his approval of the doctrine of Mr. Monroe, and asserted, in discussing the differences between Great Britain and the United States as to the disputed territory in the Northwest, that it was

our settled policy that no future European colony or dominion should, with our consent, be established on any part of the North American continent.

In resisting the introduction in the Senate in the following month of a joint resolution practically embracing the principle announced in the President's message, Mr. John C. Calhoun expressed views which later were more elaborately stated in the debate in the same body upon the bill to enable the President to take military occupation of Yucatan.

On April 29, 1848, the President called the attention of Congress to the fact that the white population of Yucatan, against whom the Indians were waging a war of extermination, had offered, if aid should be granted, to transfer the "dominion and sovereignty" of the peninsula to the United States, and stated that similar appeals had been made to the Spanish and English governments. The United States was then at war with Mexico, and Yucatan had never declared her independence, but was treated by this country as a Mexican State.

A bill to enable the President to take temporary military occupation of Yucatan was immediately introduced in the Senate. In Mr. Calhoun's speech, which was at least a limitation of the Monroe Doctrine, he declared that President Monroe referred only to the Allied Powers, and that if England should interfere at the *solicitation* of Yucatan there would be no violation of the Monroe Doc-

trine, as it would not be an interposition to change the government, the case being one of *voluntarily* surrendered sovereignty.

It should be noted that Mr. Calhoun had been a member of President Monroe's cabinet and at this time (1848) was the only survivor.

The discussion in Congress soon ended, as news was received that the whites and Indians had settled their differences.

V.

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL AND THE CLAYTON–BULWER TREATY.

THE main object of the early navigators of the Atlantic was the discovery of a direct route to the East Indies. With a more accurate knowledge of this hemisphere came the demand for some kind of transit across the Isthmus or the Central American Continent. In 1835 a resolution on the matter was adopted by the United States Senate, and in 1846 a treaty between this government and that of New Grenada (later the United States of Colombia), giving this country the right of way across the Isthmus of Panama, was signed.

The government of Great Britain naturally took a deep interest in the proposed waterway. Differences having arisen in 1848 between the Mosqui-

toes, a tribe of Indians dwelling on the coast of the Isthmus, and the Republic of Nicaragua, Great Britain, claiming to exercise a protectorate over the Mosquitoes, forced the Nicaraguans to terms. The relations between Great Britain and the United States began to assume a threatening aspect. The path, however, was soon open to negotiation, and the differences were settled by the famous Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of April 19, 1850, which was signed by Mr. Clayton, the Secretary of State for this country, and by Sir Henry Bulwer for Great Britain. No agreement ever gave rise to more vexatious and protracted discussions. While the treaty was stated to be for the purpose of setting forth the intentions of the two governments with reference to a ship-canal, it proclaims that neither government "will ever obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive control over the said ship-canal," and it practically provides for a joint protectorate. Differences between the two countries as to the meaning of the treaty constantly arose, but no attempt to build a canal was made until May, 1879, when there was held at Paris, at the call of Ferdinand de Lesseps, an "Interoceanic Canal Congress." The announcement soon after of a project to build a canal by way of Panama aroused popular feeling in this country, and hostile resolutions were introduced in Congress, but none of them were ever adopted.

Later both Presidents Hayes and Garfield took the

ground that the policy of this country was a canal under American control. Mr. Blaine, Secretary of State under President Garfield, entered into correspondence with Earl Granville as to the meaning of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. This correspondence was renewed after Mr. Frelinghuysen had succeeded Mr. Blaine as Secretary of State; but no understanding was reached.

It should be observed that there is very little question but that Mr. Clayton intended, in negotiating the treaty, to disregard the Monroe Doctrine as binding. Such was his own avowal when, on becoming a member of the United States Senate only a few years after, he was drawn into a bitter discussion with General Cass, of Michigan, as to the origin and meaning of the treaty, and as to the intentions of the contracting parties. But all the disagreements are now mere matter of history, as by the recent Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, proclaimed Feb. 22, 1902, the canal, whatever route may be selected, is to be constructed, with the carrying out of the agreement with Colombia, under the auspices of the government of the United States, and is to be subject to its management. There is also provision as to neutralization.

VI.

CUBA.

WHAT has just been said about the Interoceanic Canal demonstrates the commercial importance of Cuba. When the Spanish American colonies on the mainland threw off the Spanish yoke, Cuba remained loyal to the mother country; but in the course of time the oppressions of the ruling classes changed this loyalty to enmity.

Cuba began to be regarded by many Americans as a necessary acquisition by this country. But Spain was loath to part with so valuable a possession, even though the theatre of constant insurrection; and England seconded her in this resolution.

Mr. Clay, Secretary of State, in a communication to the American minister to France, dated Oct. 25, 1825, alluded to the unrest caused by the visit in the preceding summer of a large French fleet to American waters, and directed him to say to the French government that this country could not consent to the occupation of Cuba and Porto Rico "by any other European power than Spain, under any contingency whatever." The French government replied that the purpose of the fleet was to look out for French interests to the south of this country, and that there was an entire concurrence

by the government in the views expressed by Mr. Clay as to Cuba and Porto Rico.

After more than twenty years President Polk, in 1848, directed the American minister at Madrid to inquire if Spain was willing to dispose of Cuba for a liberal consideration, and the Minister of State replied "that he believed such to be the feeling of the country that, sooner than see the island transferred to any power, they would prefer seeing it sunk in the ocean." In the following years came the expeditions fitted out in this country against Cuba by Narcisco Lopez, and the capture and execution of that adventurer in 1851. Great Britain and France were at once aroused, and their two governments in 1852 proposed to the government of the United States that the three governments should enter into a tripartite arrangement disclaiming all intention to obtain possession of Cuba, binding themselves to discountenance all attempts to that effect on the part of others, and agreeing not to exercise any dominion over the island.

In his letter to Mr. Webster, who was then Secretary of State, dated July 8, 1852, the British minister at Washington stated the true motive of the Allied Powers when he said that the nation possessing Cuba *might either protect or obstruct the commercial routes from one ocean to the other.* Mr. Everett, who was Mr. Webster's successor as Secretary of State, in a communication to the Comte de Sartiges, dated

Dec. 1, 1852, stated with clearness and power the reasons of the declination of the President to enter into the tripartite arrangement. He declared among other things that the compact would be unequal in substance; that France and England were remote; that Cuba was almost adjacent to America, and that "it keeps watch at the doorway of our intercourse with California by the Isthmus route."

Our relations with Spain began to grow less friendly and there was much interference by the Cuban authorities with American interests. This culminated in the seizure of the American steamer "Black Warrior," in February, 1854. Deeming the purchase of the island by the United States as almost necessary, President Pierce sent directions to Mr. Soulé, the American minister at Madrid, to meet Messrs. Buchanan and Mason, our ministers respectively to Great Britain and France, "for a full and free interchange of views" relative to the project.

The three ministers met at Ostend on Oct. 9, 1854, and drew up a paper known as the Ostend Manifesto, in which they declared that an immediate effort ought to be made by the government of the United States to purchase Cuba. However, when the matter came up in the Cortes soon after, the declaration of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, that "to part with Cuba would be to part with the national honor," received the sanction of that body.

VII.

THE FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO.

FROM the time of her release from the rule of Spain in 1821 down to 1861 the political condition of Mexico was greatly disturbed. The triumph of the Liberals in 1857 resulted in the establishment of a constitutional federal government. The Church party set aside this constitution and maintained a tottering government, which fell when President Miramon was defeated by the Liberal army under Juarez, Nov. 17, 1860.

Certain outrages and spoliations, mostly committed by the Church party prior to the victory of Juarez, were regarded by the governments of Great Britain, Spain, and France as sufficient to justify an armed intervention. The practice of European Powers of enforcing money claims in Spanish American States without disturbing the form of government has long been in vogue.

The three governments entered into a convention in October, 1861, by the terms of which they disclaimed any intention to acquire territory or to interfere in the internal affairs of Mexico, and they agreed simply to demand their debts, and, if payment was refused, to take possession of Mexican ports and sequestrate the customs towards the liquidation of these debts.

Hardly had the troops of the Allied Powers disembarked at Vera Cruz when the designs of Napoleon III. were disclosed, and the English and Spanish armies withdrew. It is the common opinion that the emperor would never have committed himself to the placing of Maximilian on the Mexican throne had he not believed that the Civil War then raging in the United States was to result in the dissolution of the American Union.

That this goverment, however, even in its crippled condition, was unchanged in its adherence to the Monroe Doctrine appears from the following:

1. *From the moment when intervention seemed probable, explanations were demanded of France, and the assurance was given that her sole purpose was the enforcement of the claims of the subjects of the Emperor.*

The perfidy of Napoleon, however, is apparent from his letter to General Forey, in command of the French forces:

"It is our interest that the United States shall be powerful and prosperous, but it is not at all to our interest that she should grasp the whole Gulf of Mexico, rule thence the Antilles as well as South America, and be the sole dispenser of the products of the New World. . . . If, on the contrary, Mexico preserves its independence and maintains the integrity of its territory, if a stable government be there established with the aid of France, *we shall*

have restored to the Latin race on the other side of the ocean its force and prestige."

2. *During the entire period of the French occupation of Mexico the government of the United States recognized only the government of Juarez.*

Upon the acceptance by Maximilian of the Mexican throne in 1863, Napoleon desired the United States to recognize the new government. This the United States declined to do, maintaining that Mexico was "the theatre of a war which was not yet ended."

Meanwhile, in April, 1864, a joint resolution was passed by the National House of Representatives declaring "that it does not accord with the policy of the United States to acknowledge any monarchical government erected on the ruins of any republican government in America under the auspices of any European power."

The passage of this resolution and the debate thereon produced great excitement in France, and war actually seemed imminent, as is shown by the remark of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Dayton, the American minister to France, on April 21, 1864: "Do you bring us peace, or do you bring us war?" Mr. Dayton's instructions from Mr. Seward, which were doubtless inspired by President Lincoln, were wisely conservative, in that they stated "that the proceedings of the House of Representatives were adopted upon suggestions

arising within itself, and not upon any communication of the executive department." Thus the storm was averted.

3. *After the termination of the Civil War in the United States, the government at Washington was more pronounced than ever in warning the government of France of the consequences likely to follow the prolonged stay of the French troops in Mexico.*

In a communication of Mr. Seward to Mr. Dayton, dated Dec. 16, 1865, the President urged that France desist from the prosecution of armed intervention in Mexico; and early in 1867 the French troops had all left that country. It is believed by many that their withdrawal was largely due to the presence of General Sheridan on our southwestern frontier with a large detachment of the army.

It was affirmed by some writers in England that the occupation of Mexico by French troops was the extinction of the Monroe Doctrine. Such was not the view of Sir Edward S. Creasy, who declared in his "First Platform of International Law":

"The United States (occupied by their own Civil War, which was then raging) did not actually send troops to oppose the French in Mexico, but they steadily refused to recognize Maximilian, or any government except a republican government, in Mexico; and the language of their statesmen exhibited the fullest development of the Monroe Doctrine."

VIII.

AMERICA NORTH OF THE UNITED STATES.

THIS subject may be treated in two divisions:

1. *The disputed territory in the Northwest.*

We have already seen that this dispute largely influenced President Monroe to declare his interdiction of further European colonization upon this continent; but there were other participants in the controversy, notably the English and the Spaniards, whose differences were largely adjusted in 1790. By the treaty of 1819 Spain ceded to the United States all claims to territory north of the 42d parallel of latitude, so that the quarrel was now narrowed to the United States and Great Britain.

By a treaty between Great Britain and the United States, signed in 1818, all the Territories claimed by both parties, west of the Rocky Mountains, were left open to the citizens of both nations for two years; and by a treaty signed in 1827 those provisions were extended for an indefinite period, either party to give twelve months' notice to the other of its intention to annul the same. Finally, by the treaty of June 15, 1846, the forty-ninth parallel of north latitude was fixed as the dividing line.

The long standing differences with Russia as to the title to the North Pacific coast had been settled

by treaties between the United States and Russia in 1824, and Great Britain and Russia in 1825. More than forty years afterwards, in 1867, Alaska was ceded by Russia to the United States.

2. *Canada.*

When a serious insurrection broke out in Canada in 1837 and 1838 there was some discussion in this country as to the application of the Monroe Doctrine, but the only attempt to invoke that principle was nearly thirty years after, when a legislative union among the various colonies was effected by the "British North American Act, 1867." This led to the introduction of a resolution in the National House of Representatives declaring the uneasiness of the country in the contemplation of this federation; but the resolution was never put to vote.

IX.

VENEZUELA.

THE Monroe Doctrine has been applied in the case of disturbances in Venezuela.

1. *The controversy as to territorial jurisdiction.*

For a long period before 1895 a difference had existed between the governments of Great Britain and Venezuela as to the boundary line between the last-named country and British Guiana.

The United States Congress, on Feb. 22, 1895, in joint resolution, approved President Cleveland's suggestion that this dispute be referred to arbitration; and on July 25, 1895, Mr. Olney, Secretary of State, sent a letter to the American ambassador in London, asserting with force the application of the Monroe Doctrine to this controversy. "To-day," he declared, "the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition."

In the first of two notes, dated Nov. 26, 1895, Lord Salisbury questioned both the soundness and the application of the Monroe Doctrine; and in his second note, of the same date, he stated at length the contention of Great Britain as to the disputed territory, and refused to submit the difference to arbitration.

Thereupon President Cleveland submitted to Congress a message in which he asserted that the Monroe Doctrine "has its place in the code of international law as certainly and as securely as if it were specifically mentioned." He also suggested that Congress appropriate money "for the expenses of a commission, to be appointed by the Executive," who should make investigation and report. "When such report is made and accepted it will, in my opinion, be the duty of the United States to resist by every means in its power, as a wilful aggression upon its rights and interests, the appropriation by Great Britain of

any lands or the exercise of governmental jurisdiction over any territory which, after investigation, we have determined of right to belong to Venezuela."

The commission was soon after appointed; but as Great Britain and the United States had agreed to submit the controversy to arbitration, this commission concluded to formulate no report.

The arbitrators appointed met in Paris in 1899, and in October of that year delivered their unanimous award, definitely fixing the boundary line. While this award was generally regarded as favorable to the British contention, the fact that the British government in agreeing to arbitration practically receded from its first position, was declared by many Americans as a recognition of the Monroe Doctrine.

2. *The attempt by Germany and England to enforce their money claims.*

This recent event may be briefly treated. It is not contended that the government of Venezuela repudiated its obligations; in fact, that government only objected to the amount of the claims, and proposed that they be passed upon by a board of Venezuelans, while the creditor nations urged their reference to a mixed commission. The method adopted — the sinking of Venezuelan war vessels and the bombardment of Venezuelan ports — is believed to be one of the first attempts in history to enforce commercial demands by virtual acts of

war. It is to be noted, however, that both Great Britain and Germany disavowed to this government in advance any intention to acquire territory, the German ambassador assuring the State Department: "We declare especially that under no circumstances do we consider in our proceedings the acquisition or the permanent occupation of Venezuelan territory."

The withdrawal of the German and British war vessels from the blockade of Venezuelan ports and the adoption of measures for the settlement of the difficulty without any disturbance of the autonomy of Venezuela or appropriation of her territory, and that too through the mediation of Mr. Bowen, the American representative, have, in the opinion of many, given additional efficacy to the declaration of President Monroe.

X.

ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF AND AGAINST THE DOCTRINE.

SUCH is the historical survey of the Monroe Doctrine. As to it as a recognized obligation there is still a difference of opinion, so we offer the arguments of both advocate and opponent.

The following arguments are offered in opposition to the Doctrine:

The Doctrine has never been incorporated into the law of nations, despite Mr. Cleveland's statement in his message to Congress.

It has always failed of legislative confirmation, and the President has no right of himself to declare a principle obligatory upon foreign nations or even upon his own country. In a recent article in the "National Review," Captain Mahan well states that the Monroe Doctrine "remains a policy, not a law, either municipal or international."

There have been so many changes in the eighty years which have elapsed since the announcement of the Doctrine that it has now neither merit nor value. There is nothing to fear from European interposition. England, for example, is as advanced as America; and should her sway be extended to the turbulent Spanish American republics, they would be the better for it, and the United States would profit also in improved commercial relations.

The statement that the Doctrine has always been asserted is not true, as Mr. Calhoun practically denied the Doctrine in his debate on the situation in Yucatan, and Mr. Clayton avowed that in negotiating the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty he intended to disregard the Doctrine as binding.

President Monroe condemned the forcible extension by the Allied Powers of despotical institutions to this hemisphere. If a Spanish American republic *voluntarily* accepts the rule of a monarchical country

of Europe, it is its own business, and not that of the United States.

These Southern republics are likely to practise extortion in their dealings with foreigners, in the belief that they can constantly invoke the aid of this country. They seem to regard the Monroe Doctrine as the chicken regards its mother's wing in the moment of fear or danger.

If the American asserts that the European has no right to transfer his system to this hemisphere, what right has the American to impose his own system on the Philippines?

The following may be regarded as a fair exposition of the arguments of those who support the Doctrine.

It may be true that the Doctrine has never been formally incorporated into the law of nations; but, nevertheless, the statement of Mr. Cleveland that it has practically been so incorporated by acquiescence is correct; and it has been upheld by nearly every President since Monroe.

The fact that the Doctrine has failed of legislative confirmation is of no significance, as, during the last eighty years, the European powers have refrained from violating it. They have in reality acknowledged it.

The changes which have occurred in the last eighty years are of no moment. President Monroe

declared a principle, which cannot become obsolete so long as ambitious European monarchies exist.

President Monroe did not merely condemn the *forcible* extension by Europeans of their system to this hemisphere. He virtually opposed the transference in any form of the European system to these shores.

European governments acknowledge a right of interference in Europe whenever the ambitious designs of any of the great rulers tend to the disturbance of the proper distribution of power. The Monroe Doctrine is to America what this Balance of Power is to Europe.

The relation of the United States to the Southern republics must be considered. The government of the United States was their first friend, and the first to recognize their independence. Their subsequent recognition by Great Britain, therefore, was of no great advantage.

Finally, the original declaration of President Monroe was, except as to the principle of colonization, approved in England; and Mr. Balfour, the present premier of England, has recently stated in public that the Monroe Doctrine has no enemies in that country.

THE BORROWER WILL BE CHARGED AN OVERDUE FEE IF THIS BOOK IS NOT RETURNED TO THE LIBRARY ON OR BEFORE THE LAST DATE STAMPED BELOW. NON-RECEIPT OF OVERDUE NOTICES DOES NOT EXEMPT THE BORROWER FROM OVERDUE FEES.

Harvard College Widener Library
Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-2413